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How many times have you been speak-ing at rounds or seminars when, after going through a complex argument about a convoluted process requiring 
some attentiveness, a listener answered you with 
what you know to be a fake look of understand-
ing: ‘Yes, it makes sense’? The correct response 
would have been, ‘Wow! Who would have 
thought? It doesn’t make sense at all!’
Making sense seems to me to be the most triv-
ial attribute of any scientific or medical issue. 
What is the point of research? Surely it is not 
to find something that merely makes sense? To 
make sense of something, all one has to do is 
to rely on ‘conventional wisdom,’ which is sim-
ply the product of our accumulated knowledge. 
We acquire knowledge throughout our lives by 
experiencing the world, seeing how it looks, 
hearing how it sounds, and so on. Philosophers 
have always worried about the problem of intel-
lection, that is, how we experience and know 
the world and ourselves in it. These ideas were 
formalized by Ibn Sina (known to the West as 
Avicenna), who stated that there are four types 
of internal thinking (the soul, in his terminol-
ogy), two of which are relevant to this discus-
sion: common sense and imaginative thinking. 
Common sense was seen to be the mechanism 
of generating an object of knowledge by fus-
ing the information obtained from our senses. 
Imaginative thinking, on the other hand, com-
bines a variety of images stored in our memory 
and fuses them to form a new image.
While common sense is useful for ordinary 
interaction among people, it is of little use in 
finding out new things. In scientific research, 
common sense often leads to trivial insights. 
This is due to at least two factors. The first is 
that our sensory input is severely limited. For 
example, we see or hear only a mere fraction 
of the wavelengths that are possible; hence our 
knowledge of the other types of radiant energy 
is beyond our experience. On the other hand, 
we do possess a reasonable sense of temperature 
and pressure, since these can be felt directly by 
our senses. We find it easier to understand the 
science of phenomena that are dominated by 
our sensory perception — the classical theory of 
color, elementary aspects of energy balance (that 
is, the relationships of temperature and pres-
sure). It helps that many of these phenomena 
can be described in qualitative prose. Once one 
enters into a quantitative analysis, the glazed 
look becomes the natural response.
The second reason for our limited scientific 
intuition is that our experience of life is domi-
nated by our size. We experience the world 
around us with a unique sense of what is large 
and small, a sense that is likely to be very dif-
ferent from that of flies or whales. Our experi-
ence, thus, is dominated by gravity, but we have 
no firsthand knowledge of surface tension, for 
instance; were we insects that lived on the sur-
face of water, our notion of classical mechanics 
would be incredibly different. Hence one can 
easily assert that the evolution of humankind 
was dominated by our need for survival within 
these dimensions. Thus our brains (the product 
of this evolution) can only interpret the world 
within these limitations, limitations that are not 
conducive to coming up with general insights 
into the laws of nature, which require under-
standing of atoms and universes.
It is clear that humankind acquired knowledge 
by observation and cultural transmission and 
thus developed an intuition based on personal 
experience that allows us to make deductions 
from the observable facts that can be verified 
by our experience. These conclusions appear 
to be ‘naturally’ correct because they fit with 
our ‘instinctive’ understanding of science and 
problem solving. Ancient physicists eventually 
codified this knowledge, and this is probably 
part of why the Greeks, in particular Aristotle, 
are held in such high regard; their conclusions 
sound so ‘natural’ that they must be correct. We, 
of course, now know better; as always in sci-
ence we have to guard against allowing beauty 
to substitute for truth.
Of course the reality of science is completely 
different and even counterintuitive. We have 
difficulty understanding the big and the small; 
the universe and subatomic particles. Even 
classical mechanics is not easy to grasp; how 
could Newton’s Laws of Motion be intuitive 
when our experience with throwing a ball 
tells us that it falls to the ground? On the basis 
of our senses alone we cannot believe what 
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solid-state physics tells us, that a hard rock is 
a crystal of atoms and that most of the volume 
in that rock is actually a void. Try telling that to 
the person who is hit by a stone. We cannot see 
that the universe is expanding. The list is inter-
minable. One or two more examples will suf-
fice. Is there any sense behind why proteins are 
made only of l-amino acids but carbohydrates 
are composed only of d-sugars? These stereo-
isomers are identical in any chemical function 
you can think of except that their use in biol-
ogy is strictly determined by one or the other 
isomer. From our own field, we know that the 
congenital absence of one kidney is a common 
occurrence; how could this happen? We know 
that we have two identical kidneys and their 
development occurs simultaneously; unlike the 
heart and some other organs, the kidneys are 
bilaterally symmetrical.
Despite all of these problems we can learn 
to think about the invisible, the immaterial, 
and the counterintuitive. It is here that learn-
ing most resembles the imaginative thinking of 
Ibn Sina. We learn to develop new intuitions 
that are far from those obtained by common 
sense. We can easily learn about friction in the 
observable universe such that it becomes ‘sec-
ond nature’ to us. Or we can learn to recognize 
the importance of surface tension during cook-
ing. Each of us can learn to discuss transport of 
molecules across membranes, yet we actually 
have no perception of Brownian motion our-
selves; we are just too heavy to ‘feel’ it. Some 
subjects remain almost impenetrable; the two 
pillars of modern science, quantum mechanics 
and statistical mechanics, rarely if ever become 
second nature to most people. This suggests 
that there is a hierarchy of difficulties that we 
must overcome before we can be comfortable 
in a statistical or quantum world. The closer a 
subject is to our perceptual abilities and to our 
scale, the easier it is, and the more quantitative 
the basis of the phenomenon, the more difficult 
it becomes.
This hierarchy is not difficult to discern; we 
notice it when we teach students. The function 
of the heart and the cardiovascular system is 
relatively easy to understand and teach. The 
action of the heart as a pump is readily quanti-
fiable, but no equations are necessary to under-
stand its most clinically significant functions. 
Compare that with the kidney, an organ whose 
study was, and is, dominated by transport phys-
iology, a subfield actually of physical chemis-
try. When we get to modern biological science 
with its emphasis on molecules, pathways, and 
other things outside our immediate sensory 
understanding, our intuition gets completely 
befuddled. Hence, one can categorically state 
that new discoveries in this area will never be 
in the purview of common sense. A corollary is 
that if a conclusion makes sense, it is probably 
wrong; although you might think this is debat-
able, it is more often the case than not.
It is possible that this analysis is an idiosyn-
crasy of mine, but I think we all share it; I bring 
as evidence the letters that we all write in sup-
port of granting awards, prizes, and promotions 
of colleagues, in which we need to describe their 
work in a positive light. Those letters are always 
full of phrases of the form: ‘she had this unex-
pected finding’ or ‘he made the surprising obser-
vation…’ No one recommends somebody by 
saying that he or she discovered something that 
made sense; in other words, it could be predicted 
because it made sense. We end by agreeing with 
J.B.S. Haldane (Possible Worlds and Other Papers, 
Harper and Brothers, 1928, p286) that the uni-
verse is not only “queerer than we suppose; it is 
queerer than we can suppose.”
